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ALASDAIR MACINTYRE: 
AN ALTERNATIVE TO INDIVIDUALISM
Introduction 
Alasdair MacIntyre is a key figure in the Liberalism-Communitarianism debate, 
one of the most important and fruitful in the field of Moral and Political Philosophy 
in the second half of the 20th century. In spite of his resistance to being labeled as 
a ‘communitarianist’, MacIntyre has been considered one of the most important 
representatives (with others like Walzer, Sandel, Taylor, Etzioni, et al.) of this cur-
rent,2 one that developed to a great extent as a response to Rawls’ Liberalism in his 
1 This paper summarizes the content of a PhD dissertation finished in 2005. A short summary of this 
work was delivered as a communication at the international conference “Alasdair MacIntyre’s Revolutionary 
Aristotelianism”, held by the London Metropolitan University (London, June 29–July 1, 2007). The entire 
content of this dissertation was published in 2007 (December) in Spanish under the title Comunitarismo contra 
individualismo: una revisión de los valores de Occidente desde el pensamiento de A. MacIntyre. We thank Dr. 
MacIntyre for his comments and conversations during a stay at Notre Dame University in 2004. The bibliogra-
phy used in this paper is that published until 2005. We indicate the complete information of the bibliographic 
references (with the name of the author with capital letters) only the first time that we cite the reference.
2 There are many communitarianist authors. The most famous of them are M. Walzer, M. Sandel, 
C. Taylor, MacIntyre, R. Bellah and A. Etzioni (who founded in 1990 the communitarianist journal “The Respon-
sive Community”), although there are more (R. Unger, P. Selznick, B. Barber, R. Ketcham, J. Auerbach, C. Bay, 
J. B. Abramson, W. M. Sullivan); M. G ius ti, Contextualizando el contextualismo. Reflexiones generales sobre 
el debate entre comunitaristas y liberales, “Estudios de filosofía” 1996, (Venezuela), agosto, pp. 33–43; P. Nep i, 
Individui e persona. L’identità del soggeto morale in Taylor, MacIntyre, e Jonas, Roma 2000, p. 50; H. B. Tam, 
Communitarianism. A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship, New York 1998, p. 23; D. L. Ph i l l i p s, Looking 
Backward: A Critical Appraisal of Communitarian Thought, Princeton 1993, p. 197; E. López  Cas t e l l ón, 
Autonomía y Comunidad. Sobre el debate entre comunitaristas y liberales, “Revista de filosofía” 1996, Vol. 9, 
No. 15, pp. 183–207.
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book A Theory of Justice (1971).3 One of the most important points of Communi-
tarianism is its critique of the liberal view of the self and Ethics and Politics, that is 
to say, a critique of an individualistic view of the human being (an idea maintained 
by MacIntyre throughout his intellectual evolution). MacIntyre’s thought has been 
studied from many points of view, but there is no research on his global critique 
and alternative to Individualism. For that reason, the aim of this paper is to study 
and analyze such an alternative. The questions that we  have had to answer are two: 
1) Which are the concepts on which MacIntyre bases his alternative to Individual-
ism?, 2) Does this alternative overcome Individualism?
In order to answer these questions, we have focused on MacIntyre’s last 
period. It is known that his intellectual path includes different periods: Marxism, 
Freudianism, Christianism, etc. The most important one is that started in 1981 with 
After Virtue, a stage that opened his Aristotelic-Thomistic period, in which he con-
tinues to develop his thought.4
MacIntyre’s thought has changed through these different stages. This fact 
makes any researcher develop a special work of analysis and ‘reconstruction’. In 
order to show a coherent and unitary image of MacIntyre’s concepts, we have made 
an attempt at ‘reconstruction’, so MacIntyre does not usually explain his ideas in 
a unitary way. Besides, we have made this reconstruction from the end, that is to 
say, from his last book (until 2005), Dependent Rational Animals, as well as from 
his last papers. Personal meetings with MacIntyre (during a stay at Notre Dame 
University in 2004) have been very helpful for us in writing this paper .
The concept of ‘individualism’
The content of this part is a methodological requirement: in order to analyze 
MacIntyre’s alternative to Individualism, we need, first of all, to define what is indi-
vidualism: what do we mean when we use this word.
3 M. G ius t i, Contextualizando el contextualismo..., p. 35; P. Nep i, Individui e persona..., p. 50; 
H. B. Tam, Communitarianism..., p. 23; D. L. Ph i l l i p s, Looking Backward..., p. 197; E. López  Cas t e l l ón, 
Autonomía y Comunidad..., p. 189.
4 Therefore, this paper is based on the books After Virtue (1981), Whose Justice? Which Rationality? 
(1988), Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry (1990), First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philo-
sophical Issues (1990) and Dependent Rational Animals (1999), and also on some papers published since 1981 
(although, complementarily, we have used also some books and papers published before 1981). We focus on 
this period because is perhaps the most important period in MacIntyre’s thought, and also because it is a ‘whole’ 
that can be studied independently, as MacIntyre and some critics have said (A. Mac In ty r e, An Interview with 
Alasdair MacIntyre by G. Reddiford and W. Watts Miller, “Cogito” 1991, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 67–77, reprinted in: 
(1) The MacIntyre Reader, ed. K. Kn igh t, Cambridge 1998, pp. 267–275. In this paper, we indicate the page of 
this reprint but the year of the first edition: (2) Key Philosophers in Conversation: The ‘Cogito’ Interviews, ed. 
A. Py l e, London and New York 1999, pp. 75–84; Alasdair MacIntyre, ed. M. C. Murphy, New York 2003, 
p. 1; A. Tu l i o  Esp inosa, Alasdair MacIntyre: Ética Contextualizada, Caracas 2000, p. 3; D. W. So lomon, 
MacIntyre and Contemporary Moral Philosophy, [in:] Alasdair MacIntyre..., pp. 114–151. In fact, M. C. Murphy 
calls this period the “‘after virtue’ project”.
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‘Individualism’ is a word with different meanings and signs throughout hi-
story.5 In this field – Ethics and Political Philosophy – Individualism is often related 
to Liberalism, in such a way that MacIntyre, for instance, sometimes does not dist-
inguish between them.6 However, in an interview published in the journal Cogito in 
1991, he distinguishes between the ‘individualistic culture of modernity’ and Libe-
ralism as a changing political theory.7 We think that this distinction is appropriate for 
our aim in this first section, and want to find – for a methodological reason – the es-
sence of Individualism independently of the forms or signs that it can take according 
to specific theories, societies or periods. We are trying, therefore, to define ethical 
and political Individualism.8 This does not imply, however – as we will see – that we 
think that Individualism can be understood only from Philosophy.
The origin of Individualism comes from a set of different facts which began 
to appear in Europe during the 14th century. In that century (and later), economic, 
religious, social and political changes brought about the birth of a new European 
culture. During that time and later, European nations emerged (with their princes), 
the unitary idea of ‘Christianity’ disappeared definitively, cities increased remarkab-
ly, and capitalist economy began to spread. In Philosophy, Nominalism proposed 
a new view of knowledge and reality, etc.9
Luther and Machiavelli played an important role in configuring that new 
culture.10 Individual autonomy took an outstanding position both in religion and 
society, in economics, etc., since Individualism is a current (or rather an ‘attitude’) 
defined by theoretical and practical matters narrowly related to each other. In Phi-
losophy, Individualism was defined by Contractualism (with figures like Hobbes, 
Locke, Rousseau and Kant) and Utilitarianism (with Hume, Bentham, James Mill, 
John Stuart Mill and Sidgwick).11
5 S. Lukes, El individualismo, transl. by J. L. Á lva r ez, Barcelona 1975, p. 11. Original English ver-
sion: Individualism, Oxford 1973; A. Lau ren t, Histoire de l’individualisme, Paris 1993, p. 4.
6 A. Mac In ty r e, Individual and Social Morality in Japan and the United States: Rival Conceptions of 
the Self, “Philosophy East and West” 1991, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Oct.), pp. 489–497.
7 I dem, An Interview with Alasdair MacIntyre..., pp. 67–77. In his book Humanismo cívico, also the 
Spanish philosopher Alejandro Llano relates modernity to Individualism (A. L l ano, Humanismo cívico, Barce-
lona 1999, p. 110).
8 About this point and the following description, we thank Dr. Michael Zuckert, Dr. Javier De La Torre, 
Dra. Begońa Román, Dr. Carles Llinás, Dr. Jeff Langan, Dr. John Finnis and Dra. Mary Keys for their comments.
9 C. Ve l a rde, Liberalismo y liberalismos, “Cuadernos de anuario filosófico. Serie universitaria” 1997, 
No. 40, pp. 20, 44.
10 L. Dumon t, Ensayos sobre el individualismo, transl. by R. Tusón, Madrid 1987, pp. 87–92; S. Lukes, 
El individualismo..., p. 128.
11 C. B. Macphe r son, La teoría política del individualismo posesivo: de Hobbes a Locke, transl. J.-R. 
Cape l l a  Fon t ane l l a, Barcelona 1979, original version: The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hob-
bes to Locke, Oxford 1962, pp. 16–17; F. Va l l e sp ín  Ońa, Nuevas teorías del contrato social: J. Rawls, R. Nozick 
y J.Buchanan, Madrid 1985, p. 38; L. Dumon t, Ensayos sobre el individualismo..., pp. 93–94.
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In the light of this brief explanation and following various authors,12 we can 
define Individualism as an ethical theory based on three points:
1) The essence of human being is freedom, freedom based on autonomy, autonomy 
which is understood mainly as ‘independence’. This independence means indepen-
dence ‘of’ anything that is not the own autonomy, and it is the aim or objective to 
be protected in every field of individual life. In this way, the individual is both the 
author and the owner of his qualities.
2) Through that autonomy, the individual defines his particular interests, changing 
interests whose value is based only on the fact that they come from an independent 
choice. Moral values depend only on this autonomy and Politics depends on the 
maximization of those individual interests.
3) Society is understood, consequently, as an association of independent individuals 
united by utilitarian relationships. Society is only a means to the maximization of 
individual interests, and individual autonomy can be reduced only because of this 
maximization. Thus laws would be just a restrictive means to harmonize the search 
for that maximization.
‘Narrative person’: flourishing, virtue and community
This is the first part in this paper dedicated to the set of concepts on which Ma-
cIntyre bases his alternative to Individualism. The aim of this section is to define 
what he considers to constitute a human being, which is the first question that has 
to be answered.
We have reconstructed that set of concepts starting from the concept of 
‘flourishing’, which was developed in 1999 in Dependent Rational Animals. We 
have used it to put in order his former thought. This concept is so important that, in 
fact, MacIntyre’s view of human view can be called, in our opinion, an ‘anthropo-
logy of flourishing’.
MacIntyre does not think of a human being as a static being. He does not 
deal with ‘the’ human being but rather with ‘every/each’ human being, with ‘this’ 
person. That is why the first fact we state is that the human being is a being that de-
velops itself, is always changing, progressing: the human being ‘flourishes’. Accor-
ding to MacIntyre, someone flourishes as a human being when he has achieved 
independence in practical reasoning. This includes two features:
- to achieve an appropriate idea of good
- to achieve virtues to some extent.13
12 C. B. Macphe r son, La teoría política del individualismo posesivo..., pp. 225–226; C. Ve l a rde, 
Liberalismo y liberalismos..., pp. 44-45; A. Lau ren t, Histoire de l’individualisme..., pp. 4–5; R. S. Devane, The 
Failure of Individualism, Dublin 1948, p. 28.
13 A. Mac In ty r e, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues, London 1999.
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For this reason, in ‘anthropology of flourishing’, independence is not the pur-
pose but only a means to an appropriate definition of good, what virtue requires. 
The human being’s greatest good and final end is its flourishing (something impo-
ssible, for instance, for Rawls, who thinks that a ‘final’ end for a human being cannot 
exist).14 Flourishing is the best development of a human being as a human being, 
development which includes a physical/biological field and also an intellectual/mo-
ral one. In Dependent Rational Animals, MacIntyre pays attention to that biological 
part of a human being’s flourishing. Human identity is a bodily/corporal identity, 
as is the case also in animals. Body is something essential in both human beings 
and animals.15 This is so important for MacIntyre that he can say that human iden-
tity is an “animal identity”.16 However human flourishing is different from animal 
development because of its intellectual/moral part, because of the independence in 
practical reasoning.
The concept of ‘flourishing’ makes it possible to see individual life as a nar-
ration, as a “narrative unity”, a term coined and developed in After Virtue.17 This 
concept is perhaps one of the most famous in MacIntyre’s thought. MacIntyre says in 
this book that individual life can be understood as a ‘unity’, as a whole (with a begin-
ning, a development and an end). And it can be understood as a whole theoretically 
because it is already understood like this ‘practically’, in particular actions.18 Putting 
together both concepts (‘flourishing’ and ‘narrative unity’), we can say that human 
life is just the narration of individual flourishing (that is to say: the development of 
an individual as an independent practical reasoner).
In this way, human actions can be understood as a means to human flourishing, 
a development which is both a theoretical and a practical process. Although MacIn-
tyre does not talk about ‘eudaimonia’, it can be said that the concept of ‘flourishing’ 
assumes the structure of the Aristotelian theory of happiness. As Corral notes, if an 
action is a good action when it contributes to human unity (to human flourishing), 
“it leads us to the question about happiness and to the way to achieve it”.19
14 J. Rawl s, A Theory of Justice, Cambridge–Massachusetts 1978, Spanish transl.: Una teoría de la 
justicia, transl. by M. Do lo re s  Gonzá l ez, México–Madrid 1995, p. 554.
15 A. Mac In ty r e, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition, 
Notre Dame 1998, pp. 196–197; i dem, Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 8–9.
16 Ibidem, pp. 8–9. MacIntyre dedicates some chapters in Dependent Rational Animals (pp. 31–36, 43– 
–46, 56–61) to thinking about whether animals can have beliefs. He deals with many authors (Norman Malcolm, 
Donald Davidson, Stephen Stich, John Searle, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, John McDowell, et al.) 
and concludes that some animals can have beliefs. We agree with MacIntyre that the relationship between animals 
and human beings can be useful in order to better understand human identity, although we think that there are some 
gaps in his argument (for example, reflection on the foundation of human rationality).
17 MacIntyre does not relate these concepts to each other in Dependent Rational Animals (where he ex-
plains the flourishing), although we think that they are complementary concepts: there can be a narrow relationship 
between them. In fact, in our opinion, the concept of ‘flourishing’ is useful for understanding MacIntyre’s concepts 
previous to Dependent Rational Animals... We thank Dr. Fulvio Di Blasi for his comments on this issue.
18 A. Mac In ty r e, After Virtue..., pp. 118, 130.
19 C. Co r r a l, Acción, identidad y tradición: el argumento narrativo, [in:] Crisis de valores. Moderni-
dad y tradición (Un profundo estudio de la obra de A. MacIntyre), ed. M. Maur i, B. Román  et al., Barcelona 
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In fact, MacIntyre argues in his paper “Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: 
Rules, Virtues and Goods”, that the structure of every individual life is a “proto-
Aristotelian” structure.20 And, in that structure, everything which exists by nature 
tends to develop itself in its best possible way.21 And the best for the human being 
is happiness, its greatest good,22 so that it unifies and ‘leads’ every action.23
Flourishing, as a ‘development’ of some capacities (faculties, powers), is 
a process, therefore, in which ‘something’ grows (develops itself). For this reason, 
we think that flourishing needs a basis, a ‘ground’ from which it begins. We think 
that this basis is the ‘human nature’, human essence understood as a principle of 
operations. This common essence provides human being with faculties (powers) 
that realize their operations through the habits, the virtues. The statement of this 
basis makes the anthropology of flourishing more coherent. MacIntyre is not a me-
taphysician, but there are in his works – mainly in some of those written during the 
last 10–15 years – some references to metaphysical concepts (like the concept of 
‘human nature’).24
Following Aquinas, MacIntyre places the basis of the individual’s unity in his 
psyche’s unity.25 Nevertheless, we have to note that there is no ‘theory of the psyche’ 
in his works. Sometimes MacIntyre makes references to metaphysical concepts, and 
he acknowledges that these concepts are necessary to his thought.26 MacIntyre talks 
about ‘being’, ‘essence’, etc. (although he does not do so in a systematic way).27 He 
1997, pp. 115–142. Rawls, for instance, thinks that there cannot be ‘one’ final end in a human being: “The self 
is disfigured and put in the service of one of its ends for the sake of system” (J. Rawl s, A Theory of Justice..., 
p. 554).
20 A. Mac In ty r e, Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods, „American Catho-
lic Philosophical Quarterly” 1992, Vol. 66, No. 1, pp. 3–20. We use this reprint in this paper but we indicate the 
year of the first edition (in this reprint, there are some small changes). We can find a similar idea in the “Preface” 
to the 2nd edition of A Short History of Ethics: A Short History of Ethics, New York 1966.
21 Ar i s t o t l e, Nicomachean Ethics, 1099b, 22. We use this Spanish edition: Ética nicomáquea, transl. 
P. Bone t, Madrid 1998.
22 Ibidem, 1095a, 15; 1097a, 20; 1099a, 25.
23 Ibidem, 1097b, 21. Nevertheless, MacIntyre does not use the word ‘happiness’ but ‘flourishing’. 
When he published After Virtue, he did not know about the debate on the best translation of the Aristotelian 
concept of ‘eudaimonia’. Apart from this, he thinks that the word ‘flourishing’ is a good translation because it 
is coherent with Aristotle’s thought (and he refers to Nichomachean Ethics, 1098b, 20–22); A. Mac In ty r e, 
Moral Rationality, Tradition, and Aristotle: a Reply to O. O’Neill, R. Gaita and Stephen R.L. Clark, “Inquiry” 
1983, Vol. 26, pp. 458, 462. This issue includes the contributions delivered in a conference on After Virtue.
24 The word ‘nature’ (‘fisis’, ‘natura’) can have different meanings (see: Ar i s t o t l e, Metaphysics, 
1014b15–1015a20; Aqu inas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 82, a. 1; I, q. 80, a. 1; I–II, q. 10, a. 1). About this books, 
we use the following editions: Ar i s t o t le, Metafísica, transl. G. Yeb ra, Madrid 1998; Aqu inas, Summa Theo-
logica, transl. by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 3 vols., New York 1947. Spanish translation 
used: Suma de teología, Madrid 2001; R. Luńo, Ética general, 3rd ed., Pamplona 1998. Here we mean by 
‘human nature’ the form of human being as a principle of operations. We take its metaphysical meaning: the 
being of a thing (Aqu inas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 82, a. 1; I, q. 80, a. 1), what defines a being specifically 
(I–II, q. 51, a. 1), the foundation of its faculties/powers (ibidem, I–II, q. 10, a. 1, ad 1; Ar i s t o t l e, Metaphysics 
1014b15–1015a20).
25 A. Mac In ty r e, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., pp. 197–200.
26 For instance, in his paper Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods..., p. 152.
27 I dem, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., pp. 121–122; First Principles, Final Ends and 
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says that an Aristotelian Ethics needs a concept of ‘human nature’,28 and talks about 
a human being’s teleology, about flourishing, etc. However, he does not define a sub-
stantial concept of ‘human nature’, although we think that this is implicit (‘behind’) 
his thought. In fact, he says that Metaphysics (with concepts like ‘potentia’, ‘sub-
stantia’, etc.) is necessary for an Aristotelian-Thomistic framework,29 within which 
he has developed his thought since he published After Virtue.30
Let us remember that, in After Virtue, MacIntyre said that the best explana-
tion of Ethics was the Aristotelian one, an explanation based on a structure with 
three points: 1) human nature as it is; 2) human nature as it must be (‘telos’) accor-
ding to its essence; 3) the way between both stages: Ethics.31 We agree, therefore, 
with critics like J. L. A. García, T. Hibbs, Perreau-Saussine, J. Russell, C. Taylor 
or Lutz,32 that there is in MacIntyre’s thought a metaphysical concept of ‘human 
nature’,33
Contemporary Philosophical Issues..., Milwaukee 1990, pp. 46–47. Spanish transl.: Primeros principios, fines 
últimos y cuestiones filosóficas contemporáneas, by A. Baye r, Madrid 2003.
28 I dem, After Virtue..., pp. 52–53; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., pp. 138–139.
29 Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods..., p. 152. A good example of this 
necessity is the change in MacIntyre’s thought since After Virtue. Montoya and Matteini say that, in this book, 
he follows Aristotelian Ethics from a ‘sociological’ point of view, without accepting his ‘biological metaphysics’ 
(J. Mon toya, A propósito de “After Virtue”, “Revista de filosofía” 1983, No. 6, p. 316; M. Ma t t e in i, MacIntyre 
e la rifondazione dell’etica, Roma 1995, p. 111). In fact, Gutting thinks that MacIntyre is not a true Aristotelian in 
After Virtue (G. Gu t t i ng, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, Cambridge 1999, p. 99). But, in 
Dependent Rational Animals (pp. ix–x), MacIntyre realized that it is a mistake to separate Ethics from Metaphys-
ics in Aristotle. And he explained the same idea in an interview with Prof. Ricardo Yepes some years before, in 
1990 (Después de “Tras la virtud”. Interview with R. Yepes, “Atlántida” 1990, Vol. 1, No. 4, p. 88).
30 Lutz says that this same idea was explained by MacIntyre during a course on After Virtue in 1995 at 
Notre Dame University. In this same course, MacIntyre said that After Virtue did not include a good explanation 
on the concept of ‘human nature’ (C. S. Lu t z, Tradition in Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre, New York 2004, p. 134). 
We thank Dr. David Solomon, Dr. Dan McInerny and Dr. John O’Callaghan for their comments on this issue.
31 A. Mac In ty r e, After Virtue..., pp. 52–53.
32 J. L. A. Ga rc í a, Modern(ist) Moral Philosophy and MacIntyrean Critique, [in:] Alasdair MacIntyre..., 
p. 108; T. S. H ibbs, MacIntyre’s postmodern Thomism: reflections on “Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry”, 
“The Thomist” 1993, Vol. 57, p. 285; É. Pe r r eau -Saus s ine, Alasdair MacIntyre between Aristotle and Marx, 
[in:] www.src.uchicago.edu/politicaltheory.sausine99.pdf; J. Rus se l l, On MacIntyre, Belmont 2003, p. 36; 
C. Tay lo r, Justice After Virtue, [in:] After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, 
eds. J. Ho r ton  and S. Mendus, Cambridge 1994; C. S. Lu t z, Tradition in Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre..., pp. 
120, 139–140.
33 Some reasons for stating this idea:
1) The change in MacIntyre’s thought since After Virtue in accepting Aristotelian metaphysics (and Thomistic 
metaphysics later).
2) The idea – already explained – that the human being has/shows, in its acts and life, a ‘proto-Aristotelian’ struc-
ture. An Aristotelian Ethics, therefore, implies an Aristotelian metaphysics (A. Mac In ty r e, On Not Having the 
Last Word: Thoughts on our Debts to Gadamer, [in:] Gadamer’s Century. Essays in Honour of H.-G. Gadamer, 
eds. J. Ma lpas, U. von  Amswa ld  and J. Ke r t s che r, Boston 2002, p. 169).
3) The idea that flourishing is the development of faculties/capacities that the human being has as a human being. 
This idea assumes (perhaps implicitly) the conceptual structure through which Aquinas explains the human being, 
a structure based on the concepts of ‘essence’, ‘faculty/power’ and ‘operation’ (Aqu inas, Summa Theologica, 
I, q. 75, a. 1).
4) Sometimes MacIntyre talks about ‘human nature’ as the foundation of natural law and also as the basis of 
human capacities and inclinations (i dem, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., p. 134; Plain Persons and 
Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods…, p. 139; How Can We Learn What “Veritatis Splendor” Has to 
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Nevertheless, human nature acts and develops itself in specific practices. 
Another important feature of flourishing is that it is mainly a ‘practical’ process, 
i.e. it takes place in specific practices. The concept of ‘practice’ is very important in 
MacIntyre’s thought.
In After Virtue, MacIntyre defines the practice as “any coherent and com-
plex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that 
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and hu-
man conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended”. 
Sciences, architecture, and farming are examples of practices.34
The elements of a practice according to MacIntyre are three: goods, models 
of excellence (or authorities) and rules.35 Let us briefly consider each one of them. 
Regarding goods, he distinguishes between two kinds of them: “external goods” 
and “internal goods”. The internal ones are those goods referred to the proper ex-
cellence of a concrete practice. The best building and the best way to design it are 
internal goods to architecture. Moreover, the external ones are those goods not rela-
ted directly to the proper excellence of a practice. This kind of goods can be achie-
ved through many kinds of practices and can be independent of the achievement of 
the internal goods to the practice. These goods are money, power, prestige and so 
on. Therefore, internal goods are the proper or essential ‘telos’ of a practice.36
Rules are necessary elements of a practice because they are the guidelines or 
the norms to be followed by the individual if he wants to achieve the internal goods 
to the practices.37 Some rules have to be observed because they take the individual 
to excellence in a practice. It is necessary, for instance, to train weekly if we want 
to form a good football team.
The third element of practices is models or authorities. According to MacIn-
tyre, they are necessary because the individual needs to know the rules and the go-
ods of the practices, and also has to learn to apply the rules and realize the internal 
good. Individuals need some people to learn and to practice these elements: they 
Teach?, “The Thomist” 1994, Vol. 58, p. 173; Aquinas’s Critique of Education: Against His Own Age, Against 
Ours, [in:] Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives, ed. A. Oksenbe rg  Ror ty, London–New 
York 1998, p. 98; Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity, [in:] Common Truths: New Per-
spectives on Natural Law, ed. E. B. McLean, Delaware 2000, pp. 108, 109, 113). Nevertheless, we have to say 
MacIntyre’s references to the concept of ‘human nature’ are not always clear or systematic. For instance, when he 
describes different fields or aspects of human existence (biological, social, etc.), sometimes he talks about ‘human na-
tures’: “in ihrer Anwendung auf mensch Wesen...”, “menschliche Wesen” – he says in an interview with D. Nikulin 
(A. Mac In ty r e, “Wahre Selbsterkenntnis durch Verstehen unserer selbst aus der Perspektive anderer”. Interview 
with Dmitri Nikulin, “Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie” 1996, Vol. 44, No. 4, p. 676), or also we can read “our 
natures” in How Can We Learn What “Veritatis Splendor” Has to Teach?..., p. 177.
34 I dem, After Virtue..., pp. 187–188, 200–201.
35 Ibidem, pp. 189–190.
36 Ibidem, pp. 184–194; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., pp. 64–65.
37 I dem, After Virtue..., pp. 194–195; Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, London 1998, pp. 31–32.
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are the models or authorities.38 Finally, we can mention that virtues are the qualities 
through which the individual can distinguish and realize the internal goods to the 
practice, and follow the models and the rules related to it. According to MacIntyre, 
there are some virtues without which the individual cannot achieve the internal 
goods to the practice: justice, prudence, etc.39
For MacIntyre, practices are the natural field or place where individuals act 
and live. Social and individual life is structured by practices, which take place in 
some institutions and in a specific history or tradition. Every practice is part of a hi-
story and a tradition. An individual life is composed of many practices: someone can 
act as a father, as a lawyer, as a member of different associations, and so on. This is 
why human action cannot be explained from an individualistic point of view, i.e. as 
a result of ‘independent’ individual choices.
The relationship between practice, with its internal good, and flourishing is 
very important. In After Virtue, McIntyre of course realizes that there are practices 
which are evil in themselves: for instance, torture, sadomasochistic sexuality, etc. 
A thief can be good as a thief and, as a result, he is bad as a human being. Technical 
perfection does not imply moral perfection.40 And this distinction is based on the 
concept of flourishing, from which we can judge practices.
Because of this, MacIntyre distinguishes between three meanings of the con-
cept of good:
1) Good as a means to another good, which is a good in itself.
2) Good according to a specific practice. In this sense, an individual is good as a fa-
ther, as a teacher and so on.41
3) Good as a human being, as a member of human species. In this sense, an indi-
vidual is good if he is flourishing as such.42 In fact, this third sense of the concept 
is the main one for MacIntyre: something is good for an individual if it contributes 
to his flourishing.43 
For MacIntyre, a judgment on human flourishing is a judgment about wheth-
er an individual has developed human faculties. Because of this, he says that his 
concept of good is a ‘functional’ concept. This is a factual statement: it is a judg-
ment on the fact of the flourishing itself, rather than a subjective judgment. He 
argues that we cannot define what a ‘watch’ is without the idea of a ‘good watch’, 
which implies a specific function. So just as we cannot define ‘watch’ without the 
38 I dem, After Virtue..., p. 195.
39 Ibidem, pp. 195–196; Nietzsche O Aristotele?, [in:] Conversazioni Americane, ed. G. Bo r r ado r i, 
Roma–Bari 1991, pp. 169–187. English transl.: Nietzsche or Aristotle?, [in:] The American Philosopher: Con-
versations with Quine, Davidson, Putnam, Nozick, Danto, Rorty, Cavell, MacIntyre, and Kuhn, ed. G. Bo r r a -
do r i, Chicago 1994, pp. 137–152. Spanish transl.: Nietzsche o Aristóteles?, [in:] Conversaciones filosóficas (El 
nuevo pensamiento norteamericano), transl. J. A. Me j í a, Santafé de Bogotá 1996, pp. 199–219.
40 A. Mac In ty r e, After Virtue..., pp. 200–203.
41 I dem, Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 65–66.
42 I dem, Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods..., p. 151; Dependent Rational 
Animals..., p. 66.
43 I would like to thank Prof. MacIntyre for a personal conversation on this issue.
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concept of ‘good watch’, it is impossible to define what a human being is without 
the idea of a ‘good human being’, i.e. without the idea of flourishing, which is its 
proper function.44 For this reason MacIntyre says that we cannot separate ‘to be’ 
and ‘ought to be’, at least in ‘functional’ concepts.45
Fuller calls this scheme the ‘form-function-virtue scheme’, and says that 
MacIntyre takes it from Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. They share the same scheme: 
a natural form (‘eidos’) implies a function (‘ergon’) proper of the being that posses-
ses this form, a function whose fulfillment is its final good (‘happiness’), good that 
is achieved through virtues.46 According to Wong, an important point in Greek and 
Medieval philosophy is that the human being “is understood to have an essential 
nature or function”.47 This would be the only basis for moral objectivity that Ma-
cIntyre searches for.48 Let us remember that, for Aristotle, human nature is not only 
an essence but also an end, the ‘telos’ of the human being.49
We have said that every practice has its own rules. The individual has to 
assume them and follow them if he wants to achieve the internal good to the prac-
tice. We have seen that practices can be judged and understood only from flourish-
ing. Just as there are rules for practices, there are also rules for flourishing. These 
rules are the rules of natural law.50 The individual has to observe them in order to 
achieve flourishing as a human being.51 Just as flourishing is the reference from 
which to judge practices, natural law is the reference from which to judge practices’ 
rules. For MacIntyre, the good is the sense of rules: without the idea of good to be 
achieved, rules do not make sense.52 According to the MacIntyrean scheme, we can 
44 I dem, After Virtue..., pp. 57–61.
45 Ibidem, pp. 57–61; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., pp. 134–135; see also: Plain Persons 
and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and Goods..., pp. 138–139; Wahre Selbsterkenntnis durch Verstehen un-
serer selbst aus der Perspektive anderer..., pp. 676–677.
46 M. Fu l l e r, Making Sense of MacIntyre, Aldershot 1998, p. 5.
47 D. B. Wong, Virtue-Centered and Rights-Centered Moralities, [in:] Moral Relativity, Berkeley 1984, 
p. 136.
48 Ibidem.
49 A r i s t o t l e, Politics, 1252b 8–9; we use this Spanish edition: Política, transl. G. Va ldé s, Madrid 
1999, 2nd ed. We think that, for MacIntyre (although he does not use these words), finally the good is essentially 
what perfects or improves a nature (like for Aqu inas, Summa Theologica, I–II, q. 54, a. 3, ad 2), and, therefore, 
that towards which this nature tends (ibidem, I–II, q. 1, a. 4; Ar i s t o t l e, Metaphysics, I, 983a, 32; Nicomachean 
Ethics, I, 1094a, 2–3; X, 1173a, 1).
50 Natural law is a topic with which MacIntyre has dealt mainly in papers or articles.
51 A. Mac In ty r e, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., p. 139; Plain Persons and Moral Philoso-
phy: Rules, Virtues and Goods..., p. 143; How Can We Learn What “Veritatis Splendor” Has to Teach?..., p. 173; 
Wahre Selbsterkenntnis durch Verstehen unserer selbst aus der Perspektive anderer..., pp. 676–677; Dependent 
Rational Animals..., pp. ix–x; The Privatization of Good. An Inaugural Lecture, “The Review of Politics” 1994, 
Vol. 52, No. 3, p. 344. Inaugural lecture for MacMahon-Hank Chair of Univerisity Notre Dame, reprinted in: The 
Liberalism-Communitarianism Debate: Liberty and Community Values, ed. C. F. De l aney, Lanham 1994, pp. 
1–17. German transl.: Die Privatisierung des Gutens, [in:] Pathologien des Sozialen: Die Aufgaben der Sozial-
philosophie, ed. A. Honne th, Frankfurt a. M. 1994, pp. 163–83.
52 A. Mac In ty r e, After Virtue..., pp. 194–195; The Privatization of Good. An Inaugural Lecture..., 
p. 344; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., p. 139; Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and 
Goods..., p. 143; Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. ix–x.
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see that human autonomy acts under the guide of rules that do not come from it 
(from individual autonomy).
MacIntyre, following Aquinas, thinks that common human nature is the only 
foundation for natural law, and that this law implies and is directed to the final 
‘telos’ of human being.53 However, he thinks that the most difficult thing in the 
reflection on natural law is perhaps how to know and to define the precepts of that 
natural law.54
For our author, natural law can be known and defined only from social prac-
tices, that is to say, from those activities in which the individual participates and 
which take place in a community.55 In his paper “Natural Law Reconsidered” (of 
1997), MacIntyre agrees with Aquinas in deriving natural law from inclinations of 
human nature,56 as we can read in Summa Theologica.57 Nevertheless, he prefers 
another way to natural law.58
MacIntyre tells us that, for Aquinas,59 an essential feature of any precept 
which is a law is that it is a rule of reason directed to the common good. MacIntyre 
derives from this idea that, in order to define the good – and the goods – and the 
rules, the very inclinations of human nature are not enough. Perhaps it is better to 
start with actions, debates and discussions about goods and rules which happen in 
practices when people are concerned about any common good.60 Reflection and 
enquiry come after this fact, the fact of the practice, and then goods and rules nec-
essary for everybody are found by people involved in these practices.61
In fact, MacIntyre thinks that this argument was proposed implicitly by 
Aquinas, since ordinary people at first do not derive natural law from metaphysical 
premises.62 If human nature is known through its operations and through the actions 
53 I dem, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., p. 133; Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of 
Advanced Modernity…, p. 113.
54 I dem, Natural Law Reconsidered. Review of “Aquinas’s Theory of Natural Law: An Analytic Re-
construction”, by A. J. L i s ska, “International Philosophical Quarterly” 1994, Vol. 37, No. 1, issue 145, p. 98; 
Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity..., p. 95.
55 I dem, Community, Law, and the Idiom and Rhetoric of Rights, “Listening: Journal of Religion and 
Culture” 1994, Vol. 26, No. 2, p. 110; The Theses on Feuerbach: A Road Not Taken, [in:] Artifacts, Representa-
tions and Social Practice, eds. C. C. Gou ld  and R. S. Cohen, Dordrecht 1998, pp. 277–290. Also: Natural Law 
As Subversive: The Case of Aquinas, “Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies” 1998, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 
80–81; Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity..., pp. 109–110.
56 I dem, Natural Law Reconsidered..., pp. 98–99.
57 Aqu inas, Summa theologica, I–II, q. 94, a. 2. He describes that argument in his paper Natural Law 
Reconsidered... (pp. 98–99): the human being has some “dispositional properties”, which tend to some goods and 
“fulfillments”, but only through reason and will. The rules of natural law are the references for this process, for 
human flourishing.
58 I would like to thank Prof. MacIntyre for a personal conversation about this issue (August 2004).
59 Aqu ina s, Summa theologica, I–II, q. 90, a. 1–2.
60 A. Mac In ty r e, Natural Law Reconsidered..., pp. 98–99.
61 I dem, Después de Tras la virtud..., p. 93; Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Mo-
dernity..., pp. 94–95. MacIntyre mentions the role of the ‘sinderesis’ (in Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., 
p. 194), but he does not analyzes it.
62 I dem, Natural Law Reconsidered..., p. 98.
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realized by an individual, the practices are really important because they are the 
field or the context of those actions.63 This is why MacIntyre concludes that: “the 
recognition of natural law is a matter of how such practices are structured”.64
The MacIntyrean concept of ‘virtue’ can be understood only from the con-
cepts explained so far: ‘practice’ and ‘flourishing’. Starting from the concepts of 
‘flourishing’ (‘narrative unity’) and ‘practice’, MacIntyre gradually defines the 
concept of ‘virtue’ in After Virtue and Dependent Rational Animals.65 Virtues help 
human beings both in practices and in searching for the good: “The virtues there-
fore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only sustain practices 
and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which will also sustain 
us in the relevant kind of quest for good, by enabling us to overcome the harms, 
dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and which will furnish 
us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of good”.66
Complementarily, MacIntyre says, in Dependent Rational Animals, that 
virtues are ‘excellences’; they are “those qualities of mind and character that en-
able someone both to recognize the relevant goods and to use the relevant skills in 
achieving them”.67 We can see, therefore, that virtues are shown and have influence 
on all fields of individual life. Virtues are developed in practices, but their influ-
ence goes beyond them: life as a whole (with its ‘telos’).68 Virtues, therefore, are 
necessary qualities for humans in order to see (to grasp) the good and also to apply 
the rules, in the fields of both practices and flourishing. The individual can define 
flourishing as the greatest good and the specific goods related to it only through its 
virtues, among which ‘phronesis’ plays an essential role.69
63 I dem, The Theses on Feuerbach: A Road Not Taken..., p. 234; Natural Law As Subversive: The Case of 
Aquinas..., pp. 80–81; Theories of Natural Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity..., pp. 94–95, 109–110.
64 I dem, Natural Law As Subversive: The Case of Aquinas..., pp. 80–81. Although MacInyre does not 
talk about natural law in his paper published in 1978, and published again in 1985, The Right to Die Garrulously, 
he pays attention to the fact that rules exist in specific practices and communities (i dem, The Right to Die Gar-
rulously, [in:] Death and Decision, ed. E. McMul l i n, Boulder 1985, pp. 76, 83–84). As an example of this 
argument, we can look at what MacIntyre calls the “ethics of enquiry”, which is involved in the practice of moral 
and political debate. He defines it as “an additional authority that is independent of moral standpoint” (i dem, 
Toleration and the goods of conflict, [in:] The Politics of Toleration in Modern Life, ed. S. Mendus, Durham 
2000, pp. 133–155). We thank the author for a copy of this paper and also his comments on it. And it is part of 
natural law (i dem, How Can We Learn What “Veritatis Splendor” Has to Teach?”..., pp. 171–195). (We use here 
references taken from different papers. MacIntyre does not unify them explicitly but the relationship between 
them seems coherent with his arguments.) The liberty to express an opinion, the respect for people participating in 
the debate and so on: all of these are principles or virtues which form that ‘ethics of enquiry’. MacIntyre says that 
a true dialogue, a proper human dialogue, implies the acceptance of the ethics of enquiry. Perhaps someone does 
not define or state explicitly these rules but he is implicitly accepting them when he joins a public debate on moral 
or political issues (i dem, Toleration and the goods of conflict..., p. 7).
65 I dem, After Virtue..., p. 181; Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 91–92. For an analysis of MacIn-
tyrean concept of ‘virtue’ in After Virtue, Whose Justice? and Three Rival Versions, see: M. Maur i, Liberalisme 
i llibertat. Alasdair MacIntyre: la tradició de les virtuts, “Qüestions de vida cristiana” 1997, No. 194, pp. 45–56.
66 A. Mac In ty r e, After Virtue..., p. 219.
67 I dem, Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 91–92.
68 I dem, After Virtue..., pp. 201–203.
69 I dem, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., pp. 115–116; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., 
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We can see, therefore, that MacIntyrean ‘independence’ is not an individu-
alistic independence. We can say that it is a ‘dependent independence’. And it is 
dependent in its basis/grounds (the common human nature), in its end (flourishing) 
and in its means (virtues). Because of the features of the concepts of ‘practice’ and 
‘flourishing’, the individual needs the help of others in order to define and to real-
ize the good. The individual needs the help of others to learn the rules of practices 
(and how to apply them) and also to develop virtues (something necessary in order 
to achieve the internal goods to practices). The same happens in the whole process 
of flourishing. That is why, according to MacIntyre, human actions cannot be ex-
plained fully from an individualistic point of view.
We can thus understand the importance of the concept of ‘community’ in 
MacIntyre’s thought. According to him, community is the natural context of human 
flourishing. Without a community, the individual cannot achieve independence in 
practical reasoning. In this section, we will analyze why MacIntyre says this.
The MacIntyrean concept of ‘community’ comes from the Greek ‘polis’.70 
In Whose Justice? Which Rationality? he defines it as follows: “The ‘polis’ is de-
fined functionally as that form of human association whose peculiar ‘telos’ is the 
realization of good as such, a form of association therefore inclusive of all forms 
of association whose ‘telos’ is the realization of this or that particular good”.71 ‘So-
ciety’, therefore, is also a functional concept. MacIntyre defines it from its proper 
function, which is the realization of good as such (its ‘telos’).
Flourishing is a process of physical and intellectual development in which 
the individual develops faculties as a human being and also as an individual, some-
thing impossible without the help of others. In order to achieve maturity, the indi-
vidual needs the care of many people (relatives, friends, etc.) Corporal and intellec-
tual maturity would be impossible without this care. The individual starts learning 
about good, practices, virtues, etc. in that context. This is why MacIntyre says that 
the individual’s moral is primarily a particular/communitarian moral.72
Besides, once the individual has achieved corporal and moral maturity (once 
he has achieved independence in practical reasoning), there is always danger of 
damaging it. In the corporal field, the individual’s integrity can be hurt at any time, 
even to the extent that he loses his natural independence. The same happens in the 
intellectual/moral field: the individual can always make mistakes that damage his 
flourishing. This fact is called ‘vulnerability’ by MacIntyre: the individual always 
lives in a ‘vulnerability condition’. This is why ‘disability’ is an essential feature 
of the human being. Consequently, the human being is always a ‘dependent’ being. 
pp. 130–131, 139; First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues..., pp. 35–36, 41–42; 
Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 159–161.
70 I dem, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., pp. 122–123; Politics, Philosophy and the Common 
Good, [in:] The MacIntyre Reader, ed. K. Kn igh t, Cambridge 1998, pp. 241–243. In this paper, we indicate the 
pages of the English translation but indicate the year of the original version.
71 I dem, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., pp. 122–123.
72 I dem, After Virtue..., pp. 265–267.
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Vulnerability and dependency are, therefore, essential features of human existence.73 
It is worth remembering the title of the book – ‘Dependent’ Rational Animals.
Individual identity is, consequently, an identity which is formed socially. 
The self develops within a context of personal relationships.74 Other people help 
the individual in his self-knowledge: the individual knows himself because others 
know him.75 Because of these facts, MacIntyre says that the individual never pos-
sesses himself totally, and is never totally independent from the rest, as Individual-
ism states. That is why our author says: “Acknowledgment of dependence is the 
key to independence”.76.
Besides, within the community, the proper and specific context of individual 
flourishing is what MacIntyre calls “relationships of giving and receiving”. He 
also talks about another kind of relationship: “hierarchies of power” (or relation-
ships of “distribution of power”). These last relationships are those dedicated to the 
community’s government (or management), and they have their own rules. They 
are instrumental relationships and they are necessary to maintain order and institu-
tions in society.77 However ‘relationships of giving and receiving’ are much more 
important because they are ‘personal’ relationships: family, friends, etc. They are 
the primary context of human flourishing. Only in these relationships can the in-
dividual receive the necessary care to be able to flourish. Human vulnerability and 
dependency require relationships ‘of giving and receiving’. Only through these re-
lationships may the human being overcome his natural vulnerability.78 This is pos-
sible because these relationships are ruled by the virtue of ‘just generosity’.
The virtue of ‘just generosity’ is an essential virtue for understanding human 
flourishing. It unifies justice and generosity. The relationships based on this virtue 
include affections. In them, the individual can give or receive more than he gives 
or receives; individual capacities, necessity and circumstances are taken into ac-
count, etc.79 Thus we can understand that, according to MacIntyre, the individual 
good and the common good are not opposite to each other, but have a close need 
for each other. In the anthropology of flourishing, common good is not a summing 
of individual interests – as Individualism states – but a way of communitarian life 
that helps individuals to achieve their flourishing.80 “That common good is always 
the good of some whole of which the individuals are parts and it is more and other 
than a summing of individual goods”.81
73 I dem, Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 2–3, 72–73, 84–85, 91–92.
74 Ibidem, pp. 94–95; Medicine Aimed at the Care of Persons Rather Than What…?, [in:] Changing 
Values in Medicine, eds. E. J. Cas se l l  and M. S i eg l e r, Maryland 1979, p. 95.
75 I dem, Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 94–95.
76 Ibidem, pp. 84–85.
77 Ibidem, pp. 102–103.
78 Ibidem, pp. 99, 103, 128.
79 Ibidem, pp. 99–100, 119–121, 123–126.
80 I dem, Aquinas’s Critique of Education..., p. 100; Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 109–110, 119.
81 I dem, Aquinas’s Critique of Education..., p. 100.
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Therefore, the community flourishes also as a whole, and it flourishes inso-
far as its individuals flourish, that is to say, insofar as virtues are embodied in social 
relationships (just generosity specially). Society’s ‘telos’ is not only the realization 
of good as such.82 “So the good of each cannot be pursued without also pursuing the 
good of all those who participate in those relationships. For we cannot have a practi-
cally adequate understanding of our own good, of our own flourishing, apart from 
and independently of the flourishing of that whole set of social relationships in which 
we have found our place”.83
Relationships ‘of giving and receiving’ are the proper relationships of Tön-
nies’ Gemeinschaft, and they can exist only in small communities, which cannot 
take place – argues MacIntyre – in modern State structures (which are related to 
Tönnies’ Gesellschaft). The values and relationships of communities cannot be em-
bodied by the State’s institutions. MacIntyre says that some communitarianist au-
thors think that it is possible that the modern State’s institutions embody or assume 
the values of ‘community’, something impossible according to him. That is why 
MacIntyre, in his famous paper “I’m not a communitarian, but...”, does not accept 
that critics consider him to be a communitarianist.84
According to MacIntyre, communities cannot exist in a modern State as they 
existed (albeit in an imperfect way) in previous societies. Nevertheless, it is possible 
to try to reinforce and to develop relationships in small groups that share a good 
on a particular level (like hospitals, parishes, workplaces, etc.), or even in small 
groups with different moralities but in search of any specific good.85 Communitar-
ian moral (what Hegel called Sittlichkeit) is essentially different from state moral 
(Moralität).86
The MacIntyrean concept of ‘community’, therefore, has a narrower mean-
ing than the communitarianist concept – as J. C. Elvira notes.87 We agree with De la 
Torre that the population in a MacIntyrean community can be made up of hundreds 
82 I dem, Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 108–109. On the contrary, Rawls defines ‘society’ in his 
book A Theory of Justice (p. 4) as follows: “a society is a more or less self-sufficient association of persons who 
in their relations to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most part act in ac-
cordance with them. Suppose further that these rules specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good 
of those taking part in it. Then, although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is typically 
marked by a conflict as well as by an identity of interests. [...] A set of principles is required for choosing among 
the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting and agreement 
on the proper distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice: they provide a way of assign-
ing rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropiate distribution of the benefits 
and burdens of social cooperation”.
83 I dem, Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 107–108.
84 I dem, I’m Not a Communitarian, but..., “The Responsive Community”, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 91–92; 
Después de Tras la virtud..., pp. 91–92.
85 I dem, I’m Not a Communitarian...
86 I dem, Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 142–143.
87 J. C. E lv i r a, Práctica de la virtud e ideal ilustrado, [in:] Crisis de valores. Modernidad y tradición 
(Un profundo estudio de la obra de A. MacIntyre), eds. M. Maur i, B. Román  et al., Barcelona 1997, p. 25.
84 DAVID LORENZO IZQUIERDO
or thousands of people, but not of a million.88 According to MacIntyre, this kind 
of community is a group between family and State, since the family needs a big-
ger group to exist, but this ‘group’ is not the modern State.89 Although MacIntyre 
sometimes does not provide good examples in order to explain better his concept of 
‘community’, we think that it is clear that it implies a new paradigm, one called by 
Etzioni “the I and We paradigm”.90 And we agree with Carsillo that this paradigm 
implies a “redefinition of the individual” (“una ridefinizione del soggetto”).91
In part II, we have seen that, in the anthropology of flourishing, individual 
autonomy cannot be an ‘end’ (‘telos’) in an individualistic sense. In the light of the 
concept of ‘community’ explained in this part, we can again say that individual au-
tonomy cannot be the ‘principle’ of human development. The principle of flourish-
ing is not an independent autonomy but, we can say, a set of ‘co-principles’: human 
nature – explained in the previous section – and also a family, a community. The 
human being’s independence cannot be, therefore, an individualistic independence.
Nevertheless, community cannot be understood on its own. According to Ma-
cIntyre, community (with its practices and concepts) can be understood only in the 
light of a particular history. MacIntyre deals with this fact through his concept of 
‘tradition’.
Tradition: ‘narrative rationality’
The concept of ‘tradition’ is perhaps the most famous concept in MacIntyre’s thou-
ght. In his book Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, he defines ‘tradition’ with the 
following words: “an argument extended through time in which certain fundamen-
tal agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those 
with critics and enemies external to the tradition [...], and those internal”.92 The 
elements of a tradition are, therefore, three: an argument through time, and some 
fundamental agreements and conflicts (external and internal).
For MacIntyre, tradition is the global context from which a community’s 
concepts and practices can be understood. Although ‘tradition’ can have a narrow 
meaning, related only to a specific field (science, arts etc.), we think that it offers 
rather a ‘worldview’, i.e. a global view of the human being and the world.93 This 
view includes, for example, religious, scientific, practical elements.94
88 Fco. J. d e  l a  To r r e  D íaz, El modelo de diálogo intercultural de A. MacIntyre, Madrid 2001, p. 38.
89 A. Mac In ty r e, Dependent  Rational Animals..., pp. 134–136.
90 A. E t z ion i, Toward an I & We Paradigm, “Contemporary Sociology” 1989, Vol. 18, p. 173.
91 R. Ca r s i l l o, Il problema morale in MacIntyre, Bari 2000, p. 349.
92 A. Mac In ty r e, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., pp. 12–13.
93 We think that ‘worldview’ is the best translation into English of the German concept ‘Weltanschauung’ 
(‘cosmovisión’ in Spanish).
94 Because of that ‘global’ character, some critics think that MacIntyre does not define accurately what 
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A worldview, because of its global character, does not have a meaning rela-
ted only to one part of reality: it is a whole which unifies many kinds of elements so 
that, at the same time, it is formed by them (scientific and ethical theories, practices, 
religion, etc.). This whole is what MacIntyre tries to show and analyze through the 
concept of ‘tradition’ and also through his reflection on different traditions. We 
are dealing, therefore, with a ‘flexible’ and dynamic concept; a concept that can 
be defined so that, at the same time, it is not a ‘closed’ but an ‘open’ concept. That 
is why we disagree with some critics in relating this concept only to one field or 
aspect of reality.95
A tradition explains the theoretical and practical concepts of a community. 
The individual learns about the good and carries out the realization of that good in 
a communitarian debate, which includes both theoretical and practical elements that 
can be understood only within a specific tradition.96 We think that this fact can be 
called the individual’s ‘extended and secondary dependency’: in order to achieve 
flourishing, the individual depends on a community, and, at the same time, it de-
pends on a tradition, which is ‘embodied’ in its community.
According to MacIntyre, that fact implies clearly that theoretical and practi-
cal principles of human rationality are ‘principles’ only within/for a specific tradi-
tion: they make sense only in this context.97 In this sense, MacIntyrean ‘tradition’ 
would be similar to Kuhn’s ‘scientific paradigm’.98 At the same time, MacIntyre 
thinks that human rationality is a virtues-informed rationality. And individual vir-
tues are developed in practices, which take place in a tradition. That is why Ma-
tions. Review of Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, “Philosophy and Public Affairs 1989”, Vol. 18, No. 4, p. 389; 
J. Po r t e r, Tradition in the Recent Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, [in:] Alasdair MacIntyre..., p. 38; P. de  Gre i f f, 
MacIntyre: narrativa y tradición, “Sistema” 1989, Vol. 92, pp. 113–115. Apart from this, some critics think that, 
although he defines a tradition, he is not accurate in describing some specific traditions. Fco J. De  La  To r r e, 
El modelo de diálogo intercultural de A. MacIntyre..., p. 25; S. Mu lha l l, Liberalism, Morality and Rationality: 
MacIntyre, Rawls and Cavell, [in:] After MacIntyre: Critical Perspectives on the Work of Alasdair MacIntyre, eds. 
J. Hor ton  and S. Mendus, Cambridge 1994, p. 224; C. Th i ebau t, Los límites de la comunidad, Madrid 1992, 
p. 111; M. He r r e r a, Racionalidad y justicia: en torno a la obra de MacIntyre, “Sistema” 1989, Vol. 91, p. 45; 
J. Annas, MacIntyre on Traditions..., pp. 391–392; B. W. Ba l l a rd, Understanding MacIntyre, Lanham 2000, 
p. 59; A. B i e l s a, Crítica a MacIntyre: una lectura kantiana, [in:] Crisis de valores..., pp. 107–112; P. Ke l l y, 
MacIntyre’s Critique of Utilitarianism, [in:] After MacIntyre..., p. 132; T. H. I rw in, Tradition and Reason in the 
History of Ethics, “Social Philosophy and Policy” 1989, Vol. 7, issue 1, pp. 66–67. We agree, to some extent, with 
these critics, although, on the contrary, we think – like M. Maur i, Autoridad y tradición, [in:] Crisis de valores... 
p. 7 – that through MacIntyre’s examples and explanations (and the definition quoted above) we can reach (at 
least) a general view of what he means by ‘tradition’.
95 Fco J. De  La  To r r e, El modelo de diálogo intercultural de A. MacIntyre..., p. 25; J. Po r t e r, Tradition 
in the Recent Work of Alasdair MacIntyre..., pp. 53–56.
96 A. Mac In ty r e, Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative and the Philosophy of Science, “The Mon-
ist” 1977, Vol. 60, p. 462; After Virtue..., pp. 219–222; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., pp. 201–202.
97 I dem, Are there any natural rights?, Brunswick 1983, p. 15; Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., 
pp. 252–253; First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues..., p. 30.
98 Fco J. De La Torre, El modelo de diálogo intercultural de A. MacIntyre..., p. 115; R. S t e rn, MacIn-
tyre and Historicism, [in:] After MacIntyre..., pp. 146–147; A. L l ano, Presentación to Tres versiones rivales de 
la ética, Spanish version of Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., p. 15.
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cIntyre says that any Ethics is an Ethics of a particular tradition:99 “Morality which 
is no particular society’s morality is to be found nowhere”.100
These ideas have led some critics to consider MacIntyre to be a historicist.101 
If this is right, MacIntyre would have replaced ‘sociologism’ or ‘communitarian-
ism’ by something more general, ‘traditionalism’; but it is not only a kind of his-
toricism. Thus MacIntyre would not overcome relativism, since, in traditionalism, 
tradition would play the same role as culture or society in relativism. In this way, 
what we have called ‘anthropology of flourishing’ (with its universal moral prin-
ciples) would not be able to show what a human being is, but would show only 
what a human being is in the particular tradition that MacIntyre shares, the Aristo-
telian-Thomistic tradition.
This important critique would be coherent with one of the most important 
features of traditions according to MacIntyre: every tradition is justified by its own 
(internal) moral and practical principles.102 And the strongest and most coherent tra-
dition so far would be the Thomistic tradition.103 In this way, the world would be 
composed by a set of closed, ‘untranslatable’ and independent traditions in conflict.
However we think that this view is only a partial view of the MacIntyrean con-
cept of ‘tradition’. Although it is true that a tradition survives because of its resources 
to solve (internal and external) problems, the main criterion/reference for a tradition 
would be reality, that is to say, the being of the things. Internal consistency would be 
necessary but not enough. Therefore, a specific tradition overcomes other traditions 
because it finally offers the best and a more complete explanation about reality and 
the human being.104
In his book First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical 
Issues, discussing different kinds of rational justification, MacIntyre says that the 
final ‘telos’ for a demonstrative theory is the truth. According to MacIntyre, to un-
derstand is the necessary coincidence between the form of intellect and the form of 
the thing understood.105 He takes, therefore, the Aristotelian-Thomistic conception 
99 A. Mac In ty r e, After Virtue..., pp. 221–222.
100 Ibidem, pp. 265–267.
101 A. B i e l s a, Crítica a MacIntyre: una lectura kantiana..., p. 84; C. Th i ebau t, Los límites de la 
comunidad..., p. 117; J. Ha ldane, MacIntyre’s Thomist Revival: What Next?, [in:] After MacIntyre..., p. 105; 
B. Román, La propuesta comunitarista de A. MacIntyre, [in:] Crisis de valores..., p. 80.
102 A. Mac In ty r e, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., pp. 252–253, 357–358; Three Rival Versions 
of Moral Enquiry..., pp. 124–125; First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues..., p. 15, 
32; Dependent Rational Animals..., pp. 77–78, 156–157.
103 I dem, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., p. 403; First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary 
Philosophical Issues..., pp. 47–48, 55–56; A Partial Response to My Critics, [in:] After MacIntyre..., p. 298.
104 I dem, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., pp. 357–358; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry..., 
pp. 121–122; First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues..., p. 44; Aquinas’s Critique of 
Education..., p. 104; Moral Pluralism Without Moral Relativism, “Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress 
of Philosophy” 1999, Vol. 1, pp. 5–6; Truth as a Good: a reflection on “Fides et Ratio”, [in:] Thomas Aquinas: 
Approaches to Truth, eds. J. McEvoy  and M. Dunne, Dublin 2002, pp. 153–154. We thank Prof. MacIntyre for 
a manuscript of this paper and his comments on it and help.
105 A. Mac In ty r e, First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues..., pp. 44, 28.
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of the truth: “the adequacy of the intellect to its objects”.106 This is the proper ‘telos’ 
of every theoretical activity of human reason.107
“Adaequatio intellectus et rei”: This is the second meaning of ‘truth’ that 
Aquinas describes in De veritate (q. I, a. 1), because something can be true with 
respect to divine intellect and also with respect to human intellect.108 Therefore, 
MacIntyre’s philosophical enquiry is a traditional enquiry whose ‘telos’ is “a rela-
tionship of the mind to its objects which would be wholly adequate in respect to the 
capacities of that mind”.109 Truth is the proper and essential good of human intellect 
and, consequently, the proper good of a tradition.110
Regarding Ethics and practical reasoning, the conclusion that can be deduced 
from these ideas is clear for MacIntyre: moral principles (both positive and nega-
tive) are at the same time both universal and traditional principles. That is to say: 
natural law affects all human beings but knowledge, definition and application of 
its principles depend on (and occur in) a particular tradition. This is why MacIntyre 
thinks that the individual can know universal moral principles only through prac-
tices, which are always particular and traditional (think of the example of the ‘ethics 
of enquiry’). For MacIntyre, that is the true/correct Thomistic view of natural law.
For this reason, there are traditions that make easier than others the individ-
ual’s moral development and knowledge of reality. That is why we say that Ma-
cIntyrean rationality is a ‘narrative rationality’: it tends to the definition of univer-
sal principles, but its way or process of stating them is not universal but particular, 
and it depends on the features and on the development of a particular tradition. We 
can say that, for MacIntyre, the access to being is not language but tradition.
In the anthropology of flourishing, therefore, the individual is not ‘shut’ in his 
community and tradition (although this can happen), but can go beyond them. If it 
were like this, MacIntyre could not define a concept of ‘tradition’ that can be applied 
to different traditions in a ‘transtraditional’ way – as many critics have noted.111
In our opinion, this process of abstraction and reflection as well as the univer-
sal applicability of some concepts are based only on a common concept of ‘human 
nature’. MacIntyre does not state it explicitly, but we think that this idea is coherent 
106 I dem, Truth as a Good: a reflection on “Fides et Ratio”..., pp. 153–154.
107 A r i s t o t l e, Metaphysics..., 993b 20–21.
108 A. Mac In ty r e, First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophical Issues..., p. 33. In 
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de Alasdair MacIntyre, Pamplona 1999, pp. 96–98).
109 A. Mac In ty r e, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?..., pp. 360–361.
110 I dem, Aquinas’s Critique of Education..., p. 104; Moral Pluralism Without Moral Relativism..., pp. 
5–6.
111 B. Román, La propuesta comunitarista de A. MacIntyre..., pp. 74–75; P. Ke l l y, MacIntyre’s Cri-
tique of Utilitarianism..., p. 137; Fco J. De  La  To r r e, El modelo de diálogo intercultural de A. MacIntyre..., 
p. 97; C. Co r r a l, Acción, identidad y tradición: el argumento narrativo..., pp. 123, 141; J. S tou t, Virtue among 
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with his works and also with his current intellectual stage. ‘Human nature’ is com-
mon to all human beings but, at the same time and because of it, it is embodied in 
every individual. The opposition between ‘universalism’ and ‘particularism’ can be 
solved is this way. As stated above, human rationality can reach universal principles, 
but only through particular/traditional means.
Crosti thinks that this way is the proper Aristotelian way, which he calls “uni-
versalism at the end” (‘universalismo di arrivo’), in opposition to “universalism 
at the beginning” (‘universalismo di partenza’). For this reason, we think that the 
anthropology of flourishing is based on what we call a ‘traditionalist universalism’. 
Thus moral values would not depend (totally) on individual autonomy – as we see 
from the individualistic point of view – but they would depend on human nature, 
community and tradition.
Conclusion
Here we must recall the questions to be answered in order to relate them to the con-
cepts that we have dealt with so far. The questions were: 1) Which are the concepts 
on which MacIntyre bases his alternative to individualism? 2) Does this alternative 
overcome individualism? The answers to both are related to each other.
We have seen that the concepts that we can take from MacIntyre’s thought 
are three: ‘narrative person’, ‘community’ and ‘tradition’ (‘narrative rationality’). 
In dealing with the first one, we have developed the ‘anthropology of flourishing’. 
We have seen that the final end for a human being is its flourishing, which is based 
on independence in practical reasoning. However such independence is not the 
same as in the individualistic point of view.
MacIntyrean independence is a ‘dependent’ independence, and it is like this 
in its basis, its development and in its end. It is a ‘dependent’ independence in its 
basis because ‘human nature’ provides the individual with some powers/faculties 
and inclinations that do not depend on his autonomy. It is a ‘dependent’ indepen-
dence in its end (‘telos’) because its end is not itself but the good (the realization of 
the good). And, finally, it is a ‘dependent’ independence in its development because 
it would not be possible without virtues, without taking into account human vulner-
ability (and dependency) and, consequently, without community. The individualis-
tic concept of independence (and freedom), therefore, is not enough to explain the 
whole human development.
The second feature of ‘Individualism’ is that moral and political values de-
pend only on individual autonomy. We have seen that human flourishing – indi-
vidual flourishing – is ruled by laws related to the biological and moral individual’s 
development. There are rules for practices and there are also rules for flourishing, 
which are the rules of natural law. At the same time, moral debate and practices can 
take place only in a communitarian and traditional context. Because of all these 
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reasons, individual autonomy cannot be the (only) basis from which to define mor-
al principles.
Society would not be, therefore, an association of independent individuals 
united because of utilitarian relationships – as Individualism states. To talk about 
‘individual flourishing’ and ‘communitarian flourishing’ implies that human flour-
ishing is naturally an ‘interpersonal’ process: ‘my’ flourishing is ‘our’ flourishing. 
The sense or ‘telos’ of civil laws is that flourishing.
We can conclude, therefore, by saying that the MacIntyrean anthropology 
of flourishing offers a serious alternative to Individualism because, finally, it can 
offer a more coherent and true explanation of what human beings and community 
are.112 In order to do this, MacIntyre does not start from theories but rather from 
specific and particular facts: human actions in specific practices and communities. 
He starts from them and, since “action follows being” (“operatio sequitur esse”), 
he then accesses the being.
112 There are, of course, some gaps in MacIntyrean thought and, consequently, there are concepts that 
can be improved in order to make that thought more coherent: ‘human nature’, ‘community’, ‘psyche’, etc.
